Abstract. Secrecy of decryption keys is an important pre-requisite for security of any encryption scheme and compromised private keys must be immediately replaced. Forward Security (FS), introduced to Public Key Encryption (PKE) by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz (Eurocrypt 2003), reduces damage from compromised keys by guaranteeing confidentiality of messages that were encrypted prior to the compromise event. The FS property was also shown to be achievable in (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) by Yao, Fazio, Dodis, and Lysyanskaya (ACM CCS 2004). Yet, for emerging encryption techniques, offering flexible access control to encrypted data, by means of functional relationships between ciphertexts and decryption keys, FS protection was not known to exist. In this paper we introduce FS to the powerful setting of Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (HPE), proposed by Okamoto and Takashima (Asiacrypt 2009). Anticipated applications of FS-HPE schemes can be found in searchable encryption and in fully private communication. Considering the dependencies amongst the concepts, our FS-HPE scheme implies forward-secure flavors of Predicate Encryption and (Hierarchical) Attribute-Based Encryption. Our FS-HPE scheme guarantees forward security for plaintexts and for attributes that are hidden in HPE ciphertexts. It further allows delegation of decrypting abilities at any point in time, independent of FS time evolution. It realizes zero-inner-product predicates and is proven adaptively secure under standard assumptions. As the "cross-product" approach taken in FS-HIBE is not directly applicable to the HPE setting, our construction resorts to techniques that are specific to existing HPE schemes and extends them with what can be seen as a reminiscent of binary tree encryption from FS-PKE.
Finally, an FS-HPE scheme should still provide attribute-hiding, which could be threatened if (public) time periods for FS are mixed up with attributes during the encryption.
APPLICATIONS. Anonymous (H)IBE found applications in searchable encryption: anonymous IBE is known to imply public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [1, 7] ; anonymous HIBE, as discussed in [1] , provides further properties such as temporary PEKS where searching functionality can be restricted to time intervals, and enables new constructions such as identity-based encryption with keyword search (IBEKS). Okamoto and Takashima [27] anticipated HPE applications in the area of attribute-based searchable encryption, in particular they mentioned that a two-level HPE can be used to enable attribute-based searchable encryption with predicates (as a generalization of keyword search). We observe that while existing anonymous FS-(H)IBE constructions readily offer forward security to PEKS and IBEKS, obtaining this property for attribute-based searchable encryption would still require a forward secure version of HPE.
According to [10] , another application of anonymous (H)IBE is to enable anonymous and untraceable identitybased encrypted communication [10] , in a similar fashion to key-private public-key encrypted communication mentioned in [2] . We notice that FS property here is crucial, should those privacy goals be preserved for past communications after the exposure of receivers' private keys (which comes close to forward secrecy in key establishment protocols). With (H)PE these privacy properties can be adopted to attribute-based encrypted communication and -if (H)PE schemes are forward secure -remain protected in time periods preceding the exposure of private keys.
Our Contributions
FS-HPE: MODEL AND SCHEME. We formalize and design the first forward-secure hierarchical predicate encryption (FS-HPE) scheme, for zero-inner-product predicates [24] . Our scheme is secure (adaptively attribute-hiding) in the standard model under the well-known Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption [6] in bilinear groups of prime order. We first present a new syntax and security definitions that are specific to FS-HPE, in particular definition of attribute hiding had to be extended in order to account for FS, in a more complex way than in FS-HIBE definitions from [26, 39] , as explained in Section 3.3. Our FS-HPE scheme offers some desirable properties: time-independent delegation of predicates (to support dynamic behavior for delegation of decrypting rights to new users), local update for users' private keys (i.e., no master authority needs to be contacted), forward security, and the scheme's encryption process doesn't require knowledge of predicates at any level including when those predicates join the hierarchy. Considering the relationships amongst the encryption flavors, we can restrict our scheme to level-1 hierarchy and obtain first adaptively-secure FS-PE/ABE construction, or we can set the inner-product predicate to perform the equality test, in which case we would obtain the first adaptively-secure anonymous FS-HIBE scheme under the basic DLIN assumption (as an alternative to [13] that works in bilinear groups of composite order and requires new hardness assumptions).
TECHNIQUES. Our FS-HPE scheme is built based on the dual system encryption approach introduced by Waters [38] and uses the concept of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) of Okamoto and Takashima [27] . Techniques underlying forward security of the scheme can be seen as reminiscent of binary tree encryption [11] that was invented for FS-PKE and doesn't apply immediately to the more complex HPE setting. We had to resort to those techniques and modify them for integration with HPE since obtaining FS-HPE in a more direct way, e.g. by adopting the "cross-product" idea from [39] , seems not feasible with existing HPE constructions [25, 27] . On a high level, we modify the existing HPE scheme from [25] and combine two of its instances in a non-trivial way to achieve a FS-HPE scheme. One of the HPE schemes handles predicate/attibute hierarchy while another one is used for maintaining time periods using the concept behind binary tree encryption [11] . The modification of the scheme in [25] is necessary to prove security the stringent security definitions involving FS. The combination of two schemes is non-trivial due to the delegation and randomization components inherited from HPE. Our scheme perfectly synchronizes all private key components (decryption, delegation and randomization) from both HPE instances. These components are updated at each new time period and they are also used for time-independent delegation of predicates. We apply game-hopping proofs, following the general proof strategy from [28] , i.e. we first define several hard problems and prove that security of our scheme relies on them, then we prove that those hard problems can individually be used to solve the DLIN problem. SECOND ATTEMPT. Consider the following intuitive modification of the HPE scheme, e.g. [25] . The user with predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) maintains two subtrees with the same root labeled as ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ): the time subtree that evolves over time for forward security (using the concept from [11] ), and the predicate subtree to which, in case of delegation, further children can be added to expand the hierarchy. The time subtree can be viewed as a special predicate subtree where each time node ID t is denoted by a two dimensional predicate vector [24] , for example − → x IDt = (−ID t , 1). To encrypt a message at time t, the sender uses attribute vectors ( − → y 1 , . . . , − → y h , − → y IDt ),
where ID t denotes the node for time t and − → y IDt = (1, ID t ). This message can be decrypted, provided that the receiver knows the secret key for time t and the ciphertext's attributes ( − → y 1 , . . . , − → y h ) satisfy his private key predicates ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ).
The limitation of this approach is that key delegation is not independent of the time period. To guarantee forward security the user must erase the secret key corresponding to the root ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ), as its exposure would compromise the secrecy of derived keys for earlier time periods. However, if this secret key is erased then the predicate ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) can no longer be expanded, i.e. the scheme will not be able to support hierarchical key delegation at the level of that predicate. This attempts indicates that all secret keys must evolve together.
THIRD ATTEMPT. Consider a more direct FS-HPE construction where all private keys evolve over the time. Assume that attribute vectors (resp. predicate vectors) consist of alternating attributes (resp. predicates) and time identifiers, which is referred to as an attribute-time-tuple (resp. predicate-time-tuple). The private key at each node serves three purposes: decryption, hierarchical delegation, and derivation of private keys for the next time period. Predicate vectors associated with the private key of a newly added node are defined by predicate-time-tuple of its parent extended with the node-specific predicate vector. This private key can in turn be used to derive further keys for its descendants. For example, if − → x 2 extends the root − → x 1 at time t 1 and − → x 3 extends − → x 2 at time t 2 , the hierarchical predicate for the third node at time t 2 is given by ( − → x 1 , − → x IDt 1 , − → x 2 , − → x IDt 2 , − → x 3 ), where − → x IDt 1 = (−ID t1 , 1) and − → x IDt 2 = (−ID t2 , 1)
(as in the previous attempt).
In order to decrypt a message using this hierarchical predicate the ciphertext must contain attributes for the time periods t 1 and t 2 . That is, the sender must know all time periods at which different nodes on the path joined the hierarchy. Clearly, this is a limitation in terms of both scalability and privacy. That is, different private keys within the predicate hierarchy should ideally evolve in time that remains transparent to the encryption algorithm. Our exposition above shows that designing FS-HPE is not straightforward eventhough the forward security concept has been known in other encryption flavors. In our scheme, presented in Section 4, that is based on a variant of the HPE scheme from [25] and a reminiscent of the binary tree encryption from [11] , included additional tricks to overcome problems demonstrated above.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces and Assumptions
GROUPS. Let G bpg be an algorithm that on input a security parameter 1 λ outputs a description of the symmetric bilinear group setting (q, G, G T , G, e) where q is a prime, G and G T are two cyclic groups of order q, G is the generator of G, e is a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G × G → G T , i.e., e(sG, tG) = e(G, G)
st and e(G, G) = 1. We also define cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group G T of order q.
VECTOR SPACES. Let V = N G × · · · × G be a vector space and each element in V be expressed by N-dimensional vector. x = (x 1 G, . . . , x N G) (x i ∈ F q for i = 1, . . . , N ). The canonical base A of V is A = (a 1 , . . . , a N ), where a 1 = (G, 0, . . . , 0), a 2 = (0, G, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , a N = (0, . . . , 0, G). Given two vectors
Definition 1 (Dual Pairing Vector Space (DPVS) [27]
). Let (q, G, G T , G, e) be a symmetric bilinear pairing group. A Dual Pairing Vector Space (q, V, G T , A, e), generated by an algorithm denoted G dpvs , is a tuple containing a prime q, an N -dimensional vector space V over F q , a cyclic group G T of order q, a canonical base A = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) of V, and a pairing e : G × G → G T that satisfy the following conditions:
1. NON-DEGENERATE BILINEAR PAIRING: There exists a polynomial-time computable non-degenerate bilinear pairing e(x, y) =
This is non-degenerate bilinear pairing i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0.
DUAL ORTHONORMAL BASES:
A and e satisfy that e(a i , a j ) = g δi,j T for all i and j, where δ i,j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and g T = 1 ∈ G T . 3. DISTORTION MAPS: Linear transformations φ i,j on V s.t. φ i,j (a j ) = a i and φ i,j (a k ) = 0 if k = j are polynomial-time computable. We call φ i,j "distortion maps".
ORTHONORMAL BASES. Let B = (b 1 , . . . , b N ) be a basis of vector space V which is obtained from its canonical basis A using a uniformly chosen linear transformation Λ = (λ i,j )
T , where δ i,j = 1 if i = j, and δ i,j = 0 if i = j. That is B and B * are dual orthonormal bases of V. In our scheme we will use the following probabilistic algorithm G ob to generate group and DPSV parameters and the two dual orthonormal bases:
Definition 2 (Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN) [6] ). The DLIN problem is to find bit β ∈ {0, 1}, given the output (param G , G, aG, bG, acG, bdG, Y β ) of the probabilistic algorithm
The advantage of a probabilistic polynomial-time DLIN solver D is defined as
The DLIN assumption states that for any such D this advantage is negligible in λ.
Forward-Secure Hierarchical Predicate Encryption
In this section we present our model for forward secure hierarchical predicate encryption (FS-HPE). First, we highlight the idea behind FS-HPE concept and introduce some notations. In FS-HPE private keys are associated with predicate vectors and evolve over the time. At any time period i a user may join the hierarchy and receive delegated private keys. These keys are computed by the parent user for time period i and together with further secret information that is necessary to derive private keys for later time periods is handed over to the joined user. Once the user receives this secret information, at the end of each period the user updates his private key locally and erases secrets that are no longer needed. Additionally, at any time j ≥ i the user may delegate its private key down the hierarchy without contacting its parent. In any time period i a message can be encrypted using public parameters, the attribute vectors, and i. In order to decrypt for time period i users must possess private keys satisfying attributes from the ciphertext for that time.
Notations
Time Period Let the total number of time periods N = 2 κ , where κ ∈ N. Hierarchical Inner-Product Predicate Encryption We borrow some notations from [25] to describe our HPE with inner-product predicates (in Appendix A we also recall the syntax and the HPE scheme from [25] ). Let − → µ = (n; d, µ 1 , . . . , µ d ) be a tuple of positive integers such that µ 0 = 0 < µ 1 < µ 2 < · · · < µ d = n. We call − → µ a format of hierarchy of depth d attribute spaces. With Σ l , l = 1, . . . , d we denote attribute sets and each
The space of hierarchical predicates is
. Throughout the paper we will assume that an attribute vector − → y 1 = (y 1 , . . . , y µ1 ) is normalized such that y 1 = 1 (note that − → y 1 can be normalized via (1/y 1 ) · − → y 1 , assuming that
we denote the canonical basis vector (
Keys We will work with two notations for secret keys: sk w,( − → x 1,..., − → x l ) is the key associated with some prefix w of the bit representation of a time period i and a hierarchical predicate (
denotes the key associated with time i and a hierarchical predicate (
w0 is a prefix of i}.
Syntax
Definition 3. A forward secure hierarchical predicate encryption scheme (FS-HPE) is a tuple of five algorithms (RootSetup, Delegate, Update, Encrypt, Decrypt) described in the following:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , the total number of time periods N and the format of hierarchy − → µ . It outputs public parameters of the system, incl. public key PK , and a root secret key SK 0,1 , which is assumed to be known only to the master authority of the hierarchy. Delegate(SK i,l , i, − → x l+1 ) This algorithm takes as input a secret key SK i,l associated with time i on hierarchy level l and an (l + 1)-th level predicate vector − → x l+1 . It outputs the delegated secret key SK i,l+1 . This key is intended for the direct descendant at level l + 1. It is assumed that predicate vector − → x l+1 is added to the predicate hierarchy during the time period i. Update(SK i,l , i) This algorithm takes as input a secret key SK i,l and the current time period i. It outputs an updated secret key SK i+1,l for the following time period i + 1 and erases
This algorithm takes as input the public key P K, hierarchical attribute vectors
, a time period i, and a message M from the associated message space. It outputs a ciphertext C.
We assume that i is included in C. Decrypt(C, SK i,l ) This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext C and a secret key SK i,l for the time period i and predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ). It outputs either a message M or the distinguished symbol ⊥ (to indicate a failure).
Correctness. For all correctly generated P K and SK i,l associated with predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) and a time
with all but negligible probability.
Security Definition
Definition 4. A FS-HPE scheme is adaptively attribute hiding against chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following game is negligible in the security parameter:
Setup. RootSetup algorithm is run by the challenger C to generate public key P K and root secret key SK 0,1 . P K is given to A. Queries I. A may adaptively make a polynomial number of delegation queries by asking C to create a secret key for any given time period i and hierarchical predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ). In response, C computes the secret key SK i,l and reveals it to A. (Note that C computes SK i,l with the help of algorithms Delegate and Update that it may need to execute several times, i.e. depending on the input time period i and hierarchy level l.) Challenge. A outputs its challenge, containing two attribute vectors (
, and a time period I, such that
1 , . . . , − → y 
). Query phase 2. Repeat the Query phase 1 subject to the restrictions as in the challenge phase. Guess. A outputs a bit b , and succeeds if b = b.
We define the advantage of A as a quantity Adv 
h (b) ) = 1 for some b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., the queried key is not allowed to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Recently, Okamoto and Takashima [31] proposed a PE (HPE) which allow such key query, provided that M (0) = M (1) . The technique of Okamoto and Takashima [31] can be applied in our scheme to achieve strong security.
Remark 2. In Definition 4, A may ask delegation queries and obtain the resulting keys. This contrasts slightly with the HPE security definition in [25] , where A may ask the challenger to create and delegate private keys but will not be given any of them, unless it explicitly asks a separate reveal query. This is because HPE in [25] has two algorithms for computing secret keys, either directly (using the master secret key) or through delegation (using secret key of the parent node). In our FS-HPE syntax we compute secret keys through delegation only and in the security definition we are mainly concerned with maintaining time evolution for delegated keys.
Remark 3. Definition 4 can be easily extended to address chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) by allowing decryption queries. The usual restriction is that decryption queries cannot be used for the challenge ciphertext. Our CPA-secure FS-HPE scheme from Section 4 can be strengthened to resist CCA by applying the well-known CHK transformation from [12] that uses one-time signatures to authenticate the ciphertext.
4 Our Forward-Secure HPE Scheme
High-Level Description
For simplicity of presentation, our FS-HPE makes use of a version of FS-PKE scheme by Katz [22] . In Katz's scheme, time periods are associated with the leaf nodes of a binary tree while in Canetti et al. scheme [11] , time periods correspond to all nodes of the tree. Our scheme can also be realized based on the FS-PKE scheme by Canetti et al., which will give faster key update time. We utilize a full binary tree of height κ, whose root is labeled and all other nodes are labeled recursively: if the label of a node is w, then its left child is w0, and its right child is w1. Each time period i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} corresponds to a leaf identified via the binary representation of i. We denote the k-bit prefix of a d-length word w = w 1 w 2 . . . w d by w| k , i.e. w| k = w 1 w 2 . . . w k for k ≤ d. Let w| 0 = and w = w| d .
We use two HPE schemes in parallel. Private keys in each scheme contain three components: decryption, delegation and randomness. Private key of a user contains private keys from both schemes that are linked together using secret sharing. One HPE scheme is used to handle predicate/attribute hierarchy, while the other one is used to handle time evolution. Each of the two HPE schemes is a modification of the scheme in [25] , in a way that allows us to prove attribute-hiding property under more sophisticated conditions involving time evolution. The efficiency of the modified scheme is still comparable to the one in [25], i.e. it increases the ciphertext by an additional component (master component) that is used to combine both HPE schemes and is crucial for the security proof. This change implies that the length of the orthonormal bases grows from (2n + 3) · |G| in [25] to (3n + 1) · |G| in our scheme, where n is the dimension of the attribute vectors, and |G| is the length of a group element from G.
At time period i, the entity at level l with a hierarchical predicate (
, denoted for simplicity as SK i,l . It contains secret keys sk i,l and {sk w,l }) for each label w corresponding to a right sibling node (if one exists) on the path from l to the root. We view sk i,l as a decryption key, which is associated with current time i and the predicate ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ). The secret keys in {sk w,l } contain auxiliary information used to update sk i,l for future time periods and to derive its lower-level predicates. The initial keys sk 0,1 and sk 1,1 are computed in the RootSetup algorithm and are associated with the predicate − → x 1 . In general, each sk w,l contains three secret components: the decryption component (k
w,l,dec ), the randomness component (k (1) w,l,ran,1 , . . . , k (1) w,l,ran,l+1 , k (2) w,l,ran,1 , . . . , k (2) w,l,ran,|w|+1 ) and the delegation component (k
w,l,del,L ). All above components are constructed using orthonormal bases B * specified in Section 2. There are three different bases in the system. The superscript of each key component denotes its base. k
w,l,dec is the mentioned master component that links k (1) w,l,dec and k (2) w,l,dec using the secret sharing techniques. In turn, k (1) w,l,dec and k (2) w,l,dec are used in respective HPE schemes. If w represents a leaf of the binary tree then the decryption component (k
w,l,dec ) is used for decryption at time represented by w. Delegation and randomization of private keys are processed similarly as in [25] , except that upon derivation of keys for lower level predicates, we also delegate and randomize their time-dependent part. In particular, the delegation component of the l-th level key is essential to compute the (l + 1)-th level child key, and the randomness component of the l-th level key is used to re-randomize the latter's coefficients. To handle time hierarchy we deploy "dummy" nodes. Similarly, we will compute the dummy child for predicate hierarchy when time evolves. In this way, all derived keys are re-randomized.
We define a helper algorithm ComputeNext that will be called from RootSetup and Update. Given a secret key sk w,l for node w and a hierarchical predicate ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) it outputs sk (wb),l , b ∈ {0, 1} for the nodes w0 and w1 by updating the three components of sk w,l . The algorithm Update computes secret keys for the next time period through the internal call to ComputeNext and erases all secret information that was used to derive the key for the current time period. The update procedure involves all three components of the secret key. For example, for a given secret key SK i,l = (sk i,l , {sk w,l }), forward security is achieved by deleting its component sk i,l and using all three components of {sk w,l }, where w is now the label of an internal node, to derive SK i+1,l for the following time period with the help of ComputeNext.
In algorithm Delegate, a secret key sk w,l for a string w is used to derive sk w,u for a lower hierarchy level u > l and a hierarchical predicate ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x u ) that has restricted capabilities in comparison to ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ). As mentioned, the delegation component for hierarchical predicates of sk w,l is essential for the derivation of sk w,u , whose coefficients are re-randomized with the randomization component. The algorithm Encrypt requires only a time period t and a hierarchical attribute ( − → y 1 , . . . , − → y h ) to encrypt the message. We note that during encryption attributes ( − → y 1 , . . . , − → y h ) are extended with random elements from level h + 1 down to the leaf, i.e., the scheme encrypts attribute vectors on all levels in the hierarchy instead of encrypting only the input vectors. In this way, parent keys can directly decrypt ciphertexts produced for their children without taking effort to derive child keys first. The algorithm Decrypt uses the decryption key sk i,l , which is associated with time period i and hierarchical
The message is decrypted iff the attributes in the ciphertext satisfy the predicates in the decryption component of the key and the ciphertext is created at time i.
Remark 4. The two HPE schemes underlying our construction are modification of the HPE scheme from [25] . We observe, however, that the recent (H)PE schemes of Okamoto and Takashima [29, 30] could also be modified (in a similar way as [25]) to build a forward secure HPE scheme using our techniques. In this case the resulting FS-HPE scheme would have shorter private keys than in our current construction.
Detailed Specification
The five algorithms of our FS-HPE scheme are detailed in the following:
be the root predicate and let L = 2κ and − → n = (2; n, L). This initialization algorithm proceeds as follows.
3L+1 ),
The master authority needs to generate not only the secret key associated with the current time period 0 but also secret keys corresponding to the internal nodes on the binary tree whose bit representations are all 0 except for the last bit. The secret key for time 0 and predicate − → x 1 is denoted as sk 0 κ ,1 . Secret keys that will be used to derive keys for future time periods are denoted as {sk 1,1 , sk (01),1 , . . . , sk 0 κ−1 1,1 }. These values are generated recursively as follows, starting with sk 0,1 and sk 1,1 .
Computing sk 0,1 :
dec,1 , β
ran,j,1 (j = 1, 2), β
0,1,ran,1 , k
0,1,ran,2 , k
Computing sk 1,1 :
Compute
Recursion: Use sk 0,1 to recursively invoke algorithm ComputeNext, i.e. compute (sk w00,1 , sk w01,1 ) = ComputeNext(PK , sk w0,1 , w0), for all 1 ≤ |w0| ≤ κ − 1.
Output: The algorithm outputs public key PK = 1
and root secret key
Algorithm ComputeNext(PK , sk w,l , w): This is a helper method and is called by the Root Setup and Update algorithms. It takes a public key PK , a secret key sk w,l , a node w, and outputs keys sk w0,l , sk w1,l for time nodes w0 and w1 of predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ). The algorithm proceeds as follows.
Parse w as w 1 , . . . , w r , where |w| = r.
Parse sk w,l as (k
Computing sk w0,l :
ran,j , for j = 1, . . . , r + 2,
w,l,ran,t + ψk
Let sk w0,l = (k
w0,l,dec ,k
w0,l,ran,1 , . . . , k
w0,l,ran,r+2 ,
Computing sk w1,l :
ran,j,t (j = 1, . . . , r + 2), ς ran,j (j = 1, . . . , r + 2), ε
w,l,ran,t + t
w1,l,ran,1 , . . . , k
w1,l,ran,r+2 , k
Output: Output (sk w0,l , sk w1,l ).
The delegation algorithm proceeds as follows.
For each sk w,l in SK i,l compute sk w,l+1 as follows:
− Parse w as w 1 , . . . , w r , where |w| = r.
dec,t , γ
ran,j,t (j = 1, . . . , l + 2), γ
w,l,ran,t + r
ran,j , for j = 1, . . . , r + 1,
w,l+1,dec , k
w,l+1,ran,1 , . . . , k
w,l+1,ran,l+2 , k
w,l+1,ran,1 , . . . , k (2) w,l+1,ran,r+1 , k
) and erase all other information.
Algorithm Update(SK i,l , i): This algorithm follows the concept from [11, 22] to compute a private key for the next time period i + 1. Parse i as i 1 , . . . , i κ where |i| = κ.
simply output the remaining keys as the key SK (i+1),l for the next period. Otherwise, letk be the largest value such that ik = 0. Let i = i|k −1 1. Using sk i ,l , which is part of SK i,l , recursively apply algorithm ComputeNext to generate keys
. Erase sk i ,l and output the remaining keys as
Remark 5. Note that the key sk (i 0 d−k ,l) will be used for decryption in the next time period i + 1, whereas other generated secret keys will be used to compute private key of the next period.
The encryption algorithms proceeds as follows.
Compute the ciphertext components
Use sk i,l to decrypt and output
i,l,dec ) .
Correctness
To see why the scheme is correct, let C and SK i,l be as above. If − → x i · − → y i = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and C and SK i,l are encoded with the same time period i then M can be recovered as specified in the decryption algorithm due to the following equality
In the scheme, the size for the secret key SK i,l is (3n 2 + 12κ 2 + 3nl + 7n − 3nµ l − µ l + 14κ − 6rκ + r + 9)|G|, and the size of the ciphertext is (3n + 6κ + 8)|G| + |G T |, where n denotes the size of predicate vectors, κ is depth of the hierarchy, l represents the level of hierarchical predicate, µ l is the size of level l-predicate and r is the level of time node, |G| is the size of group element in G, and |G T | is the size of group element in G T .
Security Analysis
The security of our FS-HPE scheme is established through the following theorem. Theorem 1. Our FS-HPE scheme is adaptively attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time machine D such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
where ν is the maximum number of A's key queries, κ is the depth of the time tree, and ψ = (20ν(κ + 1)(n + L + 1) + 9)/q.
The proof of Theorem 1 is available in Appendix B.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the accepted notion of Forward Security to a powerful setting of Hierarchical Predicate Encryption. The resulting FS-HPE scheme offers time-independent delegation of predicates, autonomous update for users' private keys, and its encryption process doesn't require knowledge of time periods when particular predicates joined the predicate hierarchy. The scheme is forward-secure and adaptively attribute-hiding under chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption in the standard model. 
A Hierarchical Predicate Encryption
We include the syntax for Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (HPE) [25], followed by the HPE scheme.
A.1 Syntax Correctness. We require the following correctness property: for all correctly generated PK and
Otherwise, M = M with all but negligible probability.
A.2 Underlying HPE Scheme
Our forward secure HPE scheme is based on the following variant of the HPE scheme from [25] . Informally, l-th level secret key sk l = (k
l,ran,1 , . . . , k
l,ran,l+1 , k
l,del,n ) consists of three components. The decryption component (k
l,ran,l+1 ) and delegation component (k
l,del,n ). The decryption component is used to decrypt the ciphertext. The randomness component is used to re-randomize the coefficients of the delegated key, and the delegation component is essential to delegate the decryption rights to the l + 1-th level child key. We refer to [25] for the key idea of constructing the HPE.
The initialization algorithm proceeds as follows.
3n+1 ),
and secret key SK = { B * (k) } k=0,1 .
The key generation algorithm contains the following steps.
Pick ψ, α dec , η
dec,t , β
ran,j,t (j = 1, . . . , l + 1), β
del,j,t (j = 1, . . . , n)
l,del,n ).
The encryption algorithm proceeds as follows.
l,ran,j , . . . , k
.
The delegation algorithm executes the following steps.
Pick ψ , γ dec , σ dec , γ dec,t , γ ran,j,t , σ ran,j (j = 1, . . . , l + 2), γ del,j,t , σ del,j (j = 1, . . . , n) U ← F q for t = 1, . . . , l + 1.
Pick r dec , r ran,j (j = 1, . . . , l + 2), r del,j (j = 1, . . . , n)
l+1,ran,1 , . . . , k
l+1,ran,l+2 , k
l+1,del,n ).
B Proof of Theorem 1
Outline of the Proof of Theorem 1: In the proof, we have semi-functional ciphertexts and keys in addition to normal ciphertexts and keys. Semi-functional keys can decrypt all normal ciphertexts, but decryption will fail if one attempts to decrypt semi-functional ciphertexts with semi-functional keys. Similarly, semi-functional ciphertexts can be decrypted only by normal keys. A normal secret key SK i,l = (sk i,l , {sk i| k−1 1,l } i k =0 ) associated with time period i and hierarchical predicate ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) , a normal ciphertext C with hierarchical predicate ( − → y 1 , . . . , − → y h ) and time period i are shown in the scheme. A semi-functional secret key and a semi-functional ciphertext are expressed in Eqs. (9)- (11) and Eq.(12) respectively. We also introduce nominal semi-functional form which is analogue to that in [26] . A nominal semi-functional secret key and a nominal semi-functional ciphertext are expressed in in Eqs. (5)- (7) and Eq.(8) respectively. Normal ciphertexts and keys are used in the real system, while their nominal semi-functional or semi-functional counterparts are used in a sequence of security games only.
To prove the theorem, we analyze a sequence of games from Game 0 (original game) to Game 3. The challenge ciphertext is changed to a semi-functional one in Game 1. When at most ν delegation queries are issued and let κ be the depth of the time tree, there are 2ν(κ+1)(n+L+1) game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-(0, 0, 0) ), Game 2-(0, 0, 0 ), Game 2-(0, 0, 1), Game 2-(0, 0, 1 ), Game 2-(0, 0, 2), Game 2-(0, 0, 2 ) through Game 2-(ν −1, κ, (n+L) ) and Game 2-(ν − 1, κ, n + L + 1) (Game 2-(ν, 0, 0) ). In Game 2-(m, k, j), the first m × k × j keys are semi-functional and the rest of keys are normal, and challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. In Game 2-(m, k, j ), the first m × k × j keys are semi-functional and the (m × k × j + 1)-th key is nominal semi-functional while the remaining keys are normal, and challenge ciphertext is nominal semi-functional. In Game 3, all keys and challenge ciphertext are semi-functional, where the adversary has 0 advantage.
The advantage difference between Games 0 and 1 is equivalent to the advantage of Problem 1. To prove that, we construct a simulator that uses a Problem 1 instance as an input, and interpolates between Game 0 and Game 1. We show that the distribution of the secret keys and the challenge ciphertext answered by the simulator is identical to those of Game 0 provided β = 0 and those of Game 1 provided β = 1. The hardness of Problem 1 is also based on the DLIN assumption.
The advantage difference between Game 2-(m, k, j) and Game 2-(m, k, j ), is equivalent to the advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption). Here, we introduce special forms of nominal semi-functional keys and ciphertext. They are same as their counterparts in semi-functional forms except that w = γ = γ (1) +γ (2) and U ← F q . Semi-functional keys and ciphertext are simulated using Problem 2 instance when β = 1. Due to their algebra structures, semi-functional keys can always decrypt Semi-functional ciphertext when
and time periods match. Therefore, it is hard for the simulator to test for the semi-functional key by creating the semifunctional ciphertext by itself. On the other hand, γ is independently distributed from the other variables when either the predicate does not hold or time for queried key is greater than the challenge time. That is, the joint distribution of nominal semi-functional key and ciphertext is equivalent to that of semi-functional key and ciphertext when either condition holds. Hence, both of them appear identical from the adversary's view, since from the security definition the adversary's queries should satisfy at least one of the conditions (predicate does not holds and time for queried key is greater than the challenge time).
With the similar argument, we show that the advantage difference between Game 2-(m, k, j ) and Game 2-(m, k, j+ 1) is equivalent to the advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption).
In the final step, we show that Game 2-(ν, 0, 0) can be conceptually changed to Game 3.
Definition 6 (Problem 1). Problem 1 is to find bit
, 1} with probability non-negligibly better than by a random guess, where
0,1 = (
The corresponding advantage of PPT algorithm B in solving Problem 1 is defined as follows:
Lemma 1. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine D, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
The proof for Lemma 1 can be found in section B.1.
Definition 7 (Problem 2). Problem 2 is to find bit
where
2n1+1 , . . . , b
3n1+1 ),
For i = 1, . . . , n k and j = 1, . . . , n k :
Let B be a probabilistic machine, we define the advantage of B for Problem 2 as follows:
Lemma 2. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine D, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
The proof for Lemma 2 can be found in section B.1.
T , and C p denotes the number of elements in C p .
The proof of Lemma 3 was given in [28].
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove Theorem 1, We consider the following games:
Game 0. Let Game 0 denote the real security game defined in Definition 4. Game 1. Game 1 is almost identical to Game 0, except that the ciphertext for challenge attribute vectors
1 , . . . , − → y
(1)
) and a time period I is
where δ, w, ζ, ϕ, ϕ
. . , y n )), and
which is a reply to the m-th delegation query, is less than or equal to κ+1, where κ is the depth of the time tree. The number of keys in sk w,l = (k w,l , k
w,l,ran,1 , . . . , k
w,l,ran,l+1 , k
w,l,ran,1 , . . . , k (2) w,l,ran,r+2 , k
w1,l,del,L ), which is the k-th sk w,l value in SK i,l , is less than or equal to n + L + 1, where (k w,l = k
w,l,dec ). Game 2-(m, κ, n + L + 1) is Game 2-(m + 1, 0, 0). Game 2-(m, k, j ) is almost identical to Game 2-(m, k, j), except that (m × k × j + 1)-th key in sk w,l has the following form:
where , γ
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(m, k, j).
for randomness and delegate components of the hierarchical predicate, or
for randomness and delegate components of the time period, where k normal (m,k,j+1) is a correctly generated value of the reply to the j-th key in sk w,l .
Another difference is that the challenge ciphertext has the following form:
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(m, k, j). Game 2-(m, k, j + 1) (m = 0, . . . , ν − 1; k = 0, . . . , κ; j = 0, . . . , n + L): The number of keys in SK i,l = (sk i,l , {sk i| z−1 1,l } iz=0 ) which is a reply to the m-th delegation query in the game, is less than or equal to κ + 1,
where κ is the depth of the time tree. The number of keys in sk w,l = (k w,l , k
w1,l,del,L ), which is the k-th sk w,l in SK i,l , is less than or equal to n + L + 1, where (k w,l = k
w,l,dec ). Game 2-(m, k, j + 1) is almost identical to Game 2-(m, k, j ), except that (j + 1)-th key in sk w,l is computed as follows:
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(m + 1, k, j − 1).
for randomness and delegate components of the time period, where k normal (m+1,k,j) is a correctly generated value of the reply to the j-th key in the k-th sk w,l in SK i,l and in m-th key query, and
Another difference is that the challenge ciphertext is computed as follows:
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(m, k, j ). Game 3. Game 3 is almost identical to Game 2-(ν, 0, 0), except that the ciphertext for challenge attribute vectors
, and a time period I is
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν. We note that ζ and ( 
A (λ) be the advantage of A in Game 1, (2-(m, k, j)), (2-(m, k, j )), 3, respectively. It is clear that Adv A (λ). From these lemmas, we obtain 
Proof. Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1. We construct a simulator B 1 that leverages A as a black box to solve Problem 1. The procedure is shown as follows:
..,n k ,k=1,2 ) where n 1 = n and n 2 = L, and plays the role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A.
2. At the beginning of the game, B 1 gives A the public key PK = 1
), which is obtained from the Problem 1 instance. 3. When a delegation query is issued, B 1 computes a normal secret key using Delegate, Update and SK 0,1 , which is computed from ( B * (0) , B * (1) , B * (2) ).
When B 1 receives challenge attribute vectors
) and a time period I from A, B 1 computes and returns
3 ) from the instance of Problem 1 and ( − → y
. . , i κ are parsed from I. 5. After the challenge phase, delegation oracle simulation for a key query is executed in the same manner as step 3.
) generated in step 4 is distributed exactly as in Game 0, whereas if β = 1, the challenge ciphertext
) generated in step 4 is identically distributed to Game 1.
Proof. First recall that y 
is the challenge ciphertext from Game 0. In contrast, if β = 1 then the following components of the ciphertext have a different form
the challenge ciphertext from Game 1.
From the above claim, if β = 0 then simulated ciphertexts are distributed exactly as in Game 0, whereas for β = 1 their distribution is identical to Game 1. Therefore, | Adv
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2mkj , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, | Adv
Proof. Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game 2-(m, k, j) and Game 2-(m, k, j ). We construct a simulator B 2mkj that leverages A as a black box to solve Problem 2. The procedure is shown as follows:
where n 1 = n and n 2 = L, and acts as challenger in the security game against adversary A. 2. At the beginning of the game, B 2mkj gives A the public key PK = 1
), which is obtained from the Problem 2 instance. 3 . The answer to the s-th key in the k-th sk w,l in the m-th SK i,l query for time period i and hierarchical predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) is as follows: a) For 0 ≤ s ≤ j the algorithm B 2mkj computes a semi-functional key using {B * (k) } k=0,1,2 of the Problem 2 instance. b) For s = j + 1 it computes as follows:
w,l,dec )
..,ni } of the Problem 2 instance as follows:
For i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , n i :
β,1 , − If j > 0 then compute randomness and delegation components using {{h * (i)
..,ni } of the Problem 2 instance as follows::
h , c) For s ≥ j + 2 the algorithm B 2mkj computes a normal key using {B * (k) } k=0,1,2 from the Problem 2 instance.
When B 2mkj receives challenge attribute vectors
) and a time period I from A, B 2mkj computes and returns the ciphertext C = (c (0) , c (1) , c (2) , c (M ) ) where
3L+1 ,
3L+1 ) from the instance of Problem 2 and ( − → y
. (I 2k−1 , I 2k ) denotes the vector for i k , and i 1 , . . . , i κ is parsed from I. 5. After the challenge phase, delegation oracle simulation for a key query is executed in the same manner as step 3.
Claim. The distribution of the view of adversary A in the above-mentioned game simulated by B 2mkj given a Problem 2 instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 2-(m, k, j) (resp. Game 2-(m, k, j )) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1) except with probability 4/q (resp. 1/q).
Proof. It is clear that B 2mkj 's simulation of the public key generation (step 2) and the answers to the s-th query where s = j + 1 (case (a) and (c) of steps (3) and (5)) are exactly the same as the Setup and delegation oracle in Game 2-(m, k, j) and Game 2-(m, k, j ).
Next we analyze the distribution of the s-th key in the k-th sk w,l in the m-th SK i,l query for time period i and hierarchical predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) where s = j + 1 (case (b) of steps (3) and (5)). In this case values
β,j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , n i can be expressed as follows. Let
..,ni are defined as in Problem 2. If β = 1 in the instance of Problem 2 then the decryption component (k
w,l,dec ) has the same distribution as in Eq. 5, except that w = γ, where γ = 1 + 2 and w = u U ← F q of c 0 in Eq. 1. Randomness and delegation components for the hierarchical predicate and time period have the same distribution as in Eq. 6 and 7 respectively.
Next, we show that the joint distribution of the response to j + 1-th key in the k-th sk w,l in the m-th SK i,l query and of the challenge ciphertext in the simulation by B 2mkj for the given instance of Problem 2 is equivalent to the distribution in Game 2-(m, k, j) if β = 0 and to the distribution in Game 2-(m, k, j ) if β = 1.
If β = 0 then this equivalence follows easily, unless one of the following conditions holds: (1) ω defined in Problem 2 is zero, (2) 
However, those events occur with probability 4/q. If β = 1, then B 2mkj 's simulation for the key is the same as that expressed in Eq. 5, 6 and 7, and B 2mkj 's simulation for the challenge ciphertext is the same as that expressed in Eq. 8, except that w = γ, where γ = 1 + 2 , and w U ← F q of c 0 in Eq. 1. Therefore, we will show that γ is uniformly distributed and is independent from the other variables used in the simulation by B 2mkj . Since γ is related to
1 + θ 1 2) , and
where − → I z = (1, −i z ) and i 1 , . . . , i κ is parsed from I. We analyze joint distribution of these variables for the cases that appear in Definition 4.
1. When i > I, i.e., the time period of the queried key is after the time period of encoded in the ciphertext, due to Lemma 3, the pair (
) is uniformly and independently distributed over C κ z=1 θ z ·(
is thus uniformly and independently distributed over
is thus uniformly and independently distributed over F 2L q .
Considering the adversary A's restriction on key queries from Definition 4, in above two cases at least one of
) is uniformly and independently distributed over F
is independent from the distribution of 1 (resp. 2 ), which can be given by (
. Thus, γ is uniformly and independently distributed from the other variables in the simulation of B 2mkj .
Therefore, the view of A in the game simulated by B 2mkj on input an instance of Problem 2 with β = 1 is the same as in Game 2-(m, k, j ) unless ω = 0 occurs. This event happens with probability 1/q.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2mk(j+1) , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, | Adv
Proof. Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game 2-(m, k, j ) and Game 2-(m, k, j +1). We construct a simulator B 2mk(j+1) that leverages A as a black box to solve Problem 2. The procedure is shown as follows:
where n 1 = n and n 2 = L, and acts as challenger in the security game against adversary A. 2. At the beginning of the game, B 2mk(j+1) gives A the public key PK = 1
), which is obtained from the Problem 2 instance. 3. The answer to the s-th key in the k-th sk w,l in the m-th SK i,l query for time period i and hierarchical predicate vectors ( − → x 1 , . . . , − → x l ) is as follows: a) For 0 ≤ s ≤ j the algorithm B 2mk(j+1) computes a semi-functional key using {B * (k) } k=0,1,2 of the Problem 2 instance. b) For s = j + 1 it proceeds as follows:
w,l,dec , k
w,l,dec ) using {h * (0)
L+k ,
− If j > 0 then compute randomness and delegation components using {{h * (i)
computes a normal key using {B * (k) } k=0,1,2 from the instance of Problem 2.
) and a time period I from A, B 2mk(j+1) computes and returns the ciphertext
. (I 2k−1 , I 2k ) denotes the vector for i k , and i 1 , . . . , i κ is parsed from I. 5. After the challenge phase, delegation oracle simulation for a key query is executed in the same manner as step 3. 6. A outputs a bit b . If b = b , B 2mk(j+1) outputs 1. Otherwise, B 2mk(j+1) outputs 0.
Claim. The distribution of the view of adversary A in the above-mentioned game simulated by B 2mk(j+1) given a Problem 2 instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 2-(m, k, j + 1) (resp. Game 2-(m, k, j )) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1) except with probability 4/q (resp. 1/q).
Proof. It is clear that B 2mk(j+1) 's simulation of the public key generation (step 2) and the answers to the s-th query where s = j + 1 (case (a) and (c) of steps (3) and (5)) are exactly the same as the Setup and delegation oracle in Game 2-(m, k, j + 1) and Game 2-(m, k, j ).
w,l,dec ) has the same distribution as in Eq. 5, except that (γ
Randomness and delegation components for the hierarchical predicate and time period have the same distribution as in Eq. 6 and 7 respectively, except the added − → v 1 and − → v 2 randomness.
Next, we show that the joint distribution of the response to j-th key in the k-th sk w,l in the m-th SK i,l query and of the challenge ciphertext in the simulation by B 2mk(j+1) for the given instance of Problem 2 is equivalent to the distribution in Game 2-(m, k, j + 1) if β = 0 and to the distribution in Game 2-(m, k, j ) if β = 1.
If β = 0 then this equivalence follows easily, unless one of the following conditions holds:
However, those events occur with probability 4/q. If β = 1, then B 2mk(j+1) 's simulation for the key is the same as that expressed in Eq. 5, 6 and 7, and B 2mk(j+1) 's simulation for the challenge ciphertext is the same as that expressed in Eq. 8, except that except that (γ
Therefore, we will show that (γ
are uniformly distributed and independent from the other variables used in the simu-
1 +θ 1 (2) where − → I z = (1, −i z ) and i 1 , . . . , i κ is parsed from I. We analyze joint distribution of these variables for the cases that appear in Definition 4.
1. If i > I, i.e., the time period of the queried key is after the time period of encoded in the ciphertext, then due to Lemma 3, the pair (
uniformly and independently distributed over F 2n q and (
) is uniformly and independently distributed over
q . Considering the adversary A's restriction on key queries from Definition 4, in above two cases at least one of
1 +σ
distributed and independent from the other variables used in the simulation by B 2mk(j+1) . Therefore, the view of A in the game simulated by B 2mk(j+1) on input an instance of Problem 2 with β = 1 is the same as in Game 2-(m, k, j ) unless ω = 0 occurs. This event happens with probability 1/q. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7.
For any adversary A, Adv i,l is the answer to the j-th key query, and
) is the challenge ciphertext. We will define new bases
For k = 0, we set d
). We can easily verify that D (0) and D * (0) are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the original bases B (0) and B * (0) respectively.
, and compute d
n+j , which are equivalent to the following matrix computations:
2n , b
2n+1 , . . . , b
3n+1 ) and 
and B * (2) , respectively.
Keys and challenge ciphertext ({SK
, c (M ) )) of Game 2-ν are expressed over bases B (k) and B * (k) for k = 0, 1, 2 as follows:
w,l,dec,j , k
w,l,ran,1,j , . . . , k
w,l,ran,l+1,j , k (2) w,l,ran,1,j , . . . , k (2) w,l,ran,r+1,j , k
For simplicity we only show the transformation of decryption key component (k
w,l,dec,j ), The randomness and the delegation components can be constructed in a similar way.
Above keys and challenge ciphertext can also be expressed over bases D (k) and D * (k) for k = 0, 1, 2 as:
where θ j = j − λ which are uniformly, independently distributed since j
n,j , 
1,j , . . . , θ
n,j ,
1,j , . . . , η
n,j , 1 0 )
1 + β 
1,j , . . . , γ
1,j , . . . , η (1 λ , param− → n , { B (k) } k=0,1,2 ). Therefore, {SK
i,l } j=1,...,ν and C can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game 2-(ν, 0, 0) over bases (B (k) , B * (k) ) and in Game 3 over bases (D (k) , D * (k) ). Thus, Game 2-(ν, 0, 0) can be conceptually changed to Game 3 if w = 0 (in c (0) ), i.e., except with probability 1/q.
Lemma 8. For any adversary A, Adv
A (λ) = 0. Proof. The value of b is independent from the adversarys view in Game 3. Hence, Adv 
B.1 Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
In order to reduce the DLIN problem to Problems 1 and 2 from Definitions 6 and 7, respectively, we further introduce three "basic problems" that will serve in intermediate steps of the reduction:
-Basic Problem 0 in Definition 8.
-Basic Problem 1 in Definition 9.
-Basic Problem 2 in Definition 10.
In order to prove Lemmas 1 and 2 we use two intermediate Lemmas 9 and 10 which are two common lemmas in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2:
Lemma 9. Let (q, V, G T , A, e) be dual pairing vector spaces by direct product of symmetric pairing groups. Using {φ i,j }, we can efficiently sample a random linear transformation W = Proof of Lemma 1: Combining Lemma 9, 10, 11 and 12, we obtain Lemma 1.
Definition 9 (Basic Problem 1). Basic Problem 1 is to decide bit β, given (param− → n , {B (k) , B * (k) } k=0,1,2 ,
β,1 , f
β,1 , {f
i } i=2,...,n1 , {f
i } i=2,...,n2 , )
(1 λ , − → n = (2; n 1 , n 2 )) for β U ← {0, 1}, with probability non-negligibly better than by a random guess, where
(1 λ , − → n = (2; n 1 , n 2 )) :
For i = 2, . . . , n 2 : f
i ; Output (param− → n , {B (k) , B * (k) } k=0,1,2 , f
β , f
i } i=2,...,n2 , ).
Let Adv BP1 C (λ) denote the advantage of a PPT algorithm C for the Basic Problem 1.
Lemma 11. For any adversary C, there exists a probabilistic machine F, whose running time is essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv 
(1) 
β , g
β,1 , g
β,1 , {g
i } i=2,...,n1 , {g
i } i=2,...,n2 , ) over to C and, if C outputs its bit β then F forwards this bit as its own output.
We observe that: 
1 ,
1,1 = (
i , i = 2, . . . , n 1 ; g
i , i = 2, . . . , n 2 ; where ω = δ, τ = ρ, γ = σ are distributed uniformly in F q , Therefore, the distribution of (param− → n , {D (k) ,
i } i=2,...,n2 ) is exactly the same as in the instance of Basic Problem 1.
Lemma 12. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine C, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P1 B (λ) ≤ Adv BP1 C (λ) + 3/q for ( − → n = (2; n 1 , n 2 )).
Proof. C is given an instance of the Basic Problem 1, that is a tuple (param− → n , {B (k) , B * (k) } k=0,1,2 , f
β,1 , {f (1) i } i=2,...,n1 , {f (2) i } i=2,...,n2 ), and computes r 
